Research Governance in Academia: are there Alternatives to Academic Rankings? by Osterloh, Margit & Frey, Bruno S
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper Series 
ISSN 1424-0459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 423 
Research Governance in Academia: are there 
Alternatives to Academic Rankings? 
Margit Osterloh and Bruno S. Frey 
August 2009 
 
 
  
 
 
2 
RESEARCH GOVERNANCE IN ACADEMIA: 
ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES TO ACADEMIC 
RANKINGS? 
by 
Margit Osterloha,c,*, Bruno S. Freyb,c 
 
aUniversity of Zurich 
Institute of Organization and Administrative Sciences 
Universitätsstrasse 84 
CH-8006 Zürich, Switzerland 
Email: osterloh@iou.uzh.ch 
 
bUniversity of Zurich 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics 
Winterthurerstrasse 30 
CH-8006 Zürich, Switzerland 
Email: bsfrey@iew.uzh.ch 
 
cCREMA - Center for Research in Management, Economics and the Arts, Zurich 
Gellertstrasse 18, CH-4052 Basel, Switzerland 
 
                                                
* * Corresponding address: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Margit Osterloh, Institute of Organization and Administrative Science, 
Universitätsstrasse84, CH-8006 Zurich , Switzerland. 
Tel.: +41 44 634 28 41; fax: +41 44 634 49 42 
E-mail: osterloh@iou.uzh.ch. 
  
 
 
2 
 
 
RESEARCH GOVERNANCE IN ACADEMIA: 
ARE THERE ALTERNATVES TO ACADEMIC RANKINGS? 
  
 
 
Abstract 
Peer reviews and rankings today are the backbone of research governance, but recently 
came under scrutiny. They take explicitly or implicitly agency theory as a theoretical 
basis. The emerging psychological economics opens a new perspective. As scholarly 
research is a mainly curiosity driven endeavor, we include intrinsic motivation and 
supportive feedback by the peers as important determinants of scholarly behavior. We 
discuss whether a stronger emphasis on selection and socialization offers an alternative to 
the present regime of academic rankings.  
(80 words) 
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Peer reviews and academic rankings are generally considered the backbone of research 
governance in academia. The recent, lively discussion about the quality of peer reviews 
(e.g., Abramo, Angelo, & Caprasecca, 2009; Frey, 2003; Starbuck, 2005, 2006) and 
academic rankings (e.g., Adler & Harzing, 2009; Lawrence, 2002, 2003; Weingart, 2005) 
focused mainly on the issues of method and how to improve it. However, the question 
was not raised on which theoretical background peer reviews and rankings are based and 
whether this background is adequate for research governance in academia. Until today, 
there is no discussion about whether there are alternatives to the dominant principles of 
academic research governance. 
 We argue that these principles explicitly or implicitly follow mainly from the 
principal agent view, which in the literature on corporate governance has come under fire 
due to corporate failures and scandals (e.g., Benz & Frey, 2007; Daily, Dalton, & 
Canella, 2003). A corresponding, critical discussion in the field of research governance in 
academia is lacking. In our paper, we contribute to this discussion by confronting two 
different perspectives, agency theory and the newly emerging psychological economics.1
 The latter approach builds on psychologically informed economics. In line with an 
understanding of scholarly research as a mainly curiosity driven endeavor, it includes 
intrinsic motivation as a major determinant of scholarly behavior. We combine this 
approach with managerial control theory based on the work of Ouchi (1977, 1979) and 
discuss the implications derived from the two different perspectives. While agency theory 
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counts on the refinements of indicators and the measurement process, psychological 
economics builds mainly on the careful selection and socialization of scholars, on 
supporting feedback, and on symbolic benefits like awards. 
 We begin by analyzing the theoretical basis of the current dominant governance 
system for academic research, namely agency theory combined with the economics of 
science. The second section presents empirically based findings on present research 
governance, discussing the advantages and disadvantages of its backbones, namely peer 
reviews and academic rankings. Psychological economics then is suggested as a 
theoretical basis for academic governance, appreciating the unique features of research in 
academia. The fourth section considers the implications of the two perspectives for 
research governance in academia. The last section concludes by arguing that 
psychological economics presents a promising, novel avenue for research in academic 
governance. 
THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE PRESENT GOVERNANCE SYSTEM FOR 
ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
Over the past years, universities have increasingly adopted the idea that the governance 
of academic research should be subjected to the same governance as for-profit 
enterprises. This is reflected in procedures transferred from private companies. The most 
prominent examples are pay-for-performance for scholars according to output measures 
like rankings, ratings, and competitive fundraising. Overall, the reforms are aimed at the 
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establishment of an “enterprise university” (e.g., Bok, 2003; Clark, 1998; Donoghue, 
2008; Marginson & Considine, 2000; for business schools, see Khurana, 2007). 
 This concept is based on new public management and  economics of science. The 
proponents of new public management draw on the principal agent view (Kaboolian, 
1998) as proposed by Jensen and Murphy (1990). This view dominates new public 
management (Burgess & Ratto, 2003) in the same way it dominates corporate governance 
(Daily et al., 2003). Economics that “has won the battle for theoretical hegemony in 
academia and society as a whole” (Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005: 10) has come to 
dominate the analysis of all spheres of life, for instance, the family, art, sport, and 
religion (Becker, 1976). Today this approach is also applied to academia, either implicitly 
(e.g., Worell, 2009) or explicitly (e.g., Deem, 2004; Schimank, 2005). According to 
agency theory, scholars have to be monitored and sanctioned in the same way as 
managers. The underlying assumption is that control and correctly administered pay-for-
performance schemes contain the potential for opportunistic behavior, boost productivity, 
and lead to an efficient allocation of resources (Lavy, 2007; Swiss, 2005). 
 According to the  economics of science in academia the evaluation by the market 
has to be substituted for the evaluation of peers in the self-governed “republic of science” 
(Polanyi, 1962). This is the case because of two fundamental characteristics of science, 
its high uncertainty and its public nature (Dasgupta & David, 1994; Nelson, 1959, 2004; 
Stephan, 1996). 
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 The fundamental uncertainty of scientific endeavors is due to the fact that success 
in academia is reflected by success in the market often only after a long delay or 
sometimes not at all (Bush, 1945; Nelson, 2006). In addition, research often produces 
serendipity effects; that is, it provides answers to unposed questions (Stephan, 1996). As 
it is often not predictable how useful a particular research endeavor produces is and 
whether it ever will be marketable, peers instead of the market have to evaluate whether a 
piece of research represents an advance. 
 The public nature of scientific discoveries has been intensively discussed by 
Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959, 2006). A discovery must be communicated by scholars 
as quickly as possible to the community of peers in order to be recognized as  the 
discoverer of a new scientific idea (Dasgupta & David, 1994). In contrast, in profit-
oriented enterprises, incentives to transform scientific results into a public good are 
normally absent.2 
 As a consequence of these characteristics of research in academia, the “priority 
rule” has been established as the main success criterion (Dasgupta & David, 1994; 
Merton, 1957; Stephan, 1996; Gittelman & Kogut, 2003). Only peers can establish 
scientific priority. Consequently, the peer review system is taken to be the founding stone 
of academic research evaluation. Instances are awards, honorary doctorates, or 
membership in prestigious academies (Stephan, 1996; Frey & Neckermann, 2008). Its 
main form for the majority of scholars consists of publications and citations in 
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professional journals with high impact factors. Such indicators are provided by academic 
rankings, based on peer-reviewed publications, citations, and the impact factor of journals 
like Thomson Scientific’s Impact Factor (JIF) (see Garfield, 2006, for a historical review) 
and the recent h-index (Hirsch, 2005). 
 Indeed, a well-designed governance system based on peer reviews and academic 
rankings seems to combine perfectly an output-oriented evaluation of researchers, as 
postulated by new public management, on the one side, with the requirements of a peer-
based evaluation system, as postulated be the economics of science on the other side. 
Therefore, today these measures are adopted almost universally in academia for most 
things that matter: tenure, salary, postdoctoral grants, and budget decisions. 
 However, in recent times a broad discussion arose about the quality of peer 
reviews (e.g., Starbuck, 2005, 2006) and academic rankings (e.g., Adler, Ewing, & 
Taylor, 2008; Adler & Harzing, 2009; Lawrence 2002, 2003). It focused mainly on the 
issues of method, while the theoretical background on which these measures are based 
was not questioned. 
EMPIRICALLY BASED FINDINGS ON THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
GOVERNANCE IN ACADEMIA 
Findings on Qualitative Peer Reviews 
Peer reviews are the backbone of the research governance and evaluation system in 
academia. However, in recent times, it has been argued that the present peer review 
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system has major problems (e.g., Abramo et al., 2009; Bedeian, 2004; Campanario, 1996;  
Frey, 2003; Gillies, 2005, 2008; Starbuck, 2005, 2006; Tsang & Frey, 2007; Wenneras & 
Wold, 1999).3 
Low inter-rater reliability 
There is an extensive literature on the low extent to which reviews conform to each other 
(Cole, 1992; Miner & MacDonald, 1981; Weller, 2001). The correlation between the 
judgments of two peers falls between 0.09 and 0.5 (Starbuck, 2005).4 The correlation is 
higher for papers rejected than for papers accepted (Cichetti, 1991). This means that peer 
reviewers are better able to identify academic low performers; that is, it is easier to 
identify papers that do not meet minimum quality standards than those of high performers 
and those that are a result of excellent research (Moed, 2007). The reliability thus is 
particularly low with regard to the opinion of peers among published papers in top 
journals (Lindsey, 1991). 
Low prognostic quality  
The reviewers’ rating of manuscript quality is found to correlate only 0.24 with later 
citations (Gottfredson, 1978). According to Starbuck (2006: 83–84), the correlation of a 
particular reviewer’s evaluation with the actual quality as measured by later citations of 
the manuscript reviewed is between 0.25 and 0.3; this correlation rarely rises above 0.37. 
Although there is evidence that higher prestige journals publish more high-value articles 
(Judge, Cable, Colbert, & Rynes, 2007), there is much randomness in editorial selections 
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(Starbuck 2005). As a result, one editor even advises rejected authors to “Just Try, Try 
Again” (Durso 1997). However, this strategy overburdens reviewers and tends to lower 
the quality of reviews. For example, reviewers have neither enough time nor the incentive 
to check the quality of the data and of the statistical methods employed, as some striking 
examples in economics demonstrate (Hamermesh 2007). 
Reviewers’ biases 
Many rejections in highly ranked journals are documented, even regarding papers that 
later were awarded high prizes, including the Nobel Prize (Campanario, 1996; Gans & 
Shepherd, 1994; Horrobin, 1996; Lawrence, 2003). Reviewers find methodological 
shortcomings in 71 percent of papers contradicting the mainstream, compared to only 25 
percent of papers supporting the mainstream (Mahoney, 1977).  
 
Findings on Bibliometrics 
Advantages of bibliometrics 
As a reaction to the criticism of qualitative peer reviewing, bibliometric methods, that is, 
rankings and ratings based on the number of publications, citations, and impact factors 
have become more prominent.5  This procedure is expected to produce several 
advantages over qualitative peer reviews (e.g., Abramo et al., 2009). 
 First, it is more objective because it is based on more than the three or four 
evaluations typical for qualitative approaches. Although it is based on qualitative peer 
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reviews because the articles counted must have passed peer evaluation, there may occur a 
balance of reviewers’ biases by the aggregation of many reviewers’ evaluations by 
scientific statistical methods (Weingart, 2005). 
 Second, the influence of the old boys’ network may be avoided. An instrument is 
provided to dismantle unfounded claims to fame. Rankings can serve as fruitful, 
exogenous shocks to some schools and make them care more about the reactions of the 
public (Khurana, 2007: 337). 
 Third, it is cheaper than qualitative reviews, at least in terms of time. It admits 
updates and rapid intertemporal comparisons. 
 Fourth, outsiders to the scientific community, for example, politicians, 
administrators, journalists, and students, may get a transparent and easy to comprehend 
picture of scholarly activity. The evaluation process is externalized and has been said to 
have unlocked the “secrets of the world of research” (Weingart, 2005: 119). In particular, 
politicians and deans consider rankings an objective measure to allocate resources and to 
provide compensation packages (e.g., Worrell, 2009). Scholars themselves use them to 
assess the research quality of their peers. 
 However, in recent times, the disadvantages of bibliometric methods have been 
hotly discussed (Adler & Harzing, 2009; Adler et al., 2008; Butler, 2007; Donovan, 
2007b; Weingart, 2005). There are three groups of problems. Until now, mainly technical 
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and methodological problems were highlighted (van Raan, 2005). The third group, the 
dysfunctional reaction of scholars and institutions has been discussed less. 
 
Technical problems 
Technical problems consist of errors in the citing-cited matching process, leading to a 
loss of citations to a specific publication. First, is estimated that this loss amounts on 
average to 7 percent of the citations. In specific situations, this percentage may even be as 
high as 30 percent (Moed, 2002). Second, there are many errors made in attributing 
publications and citations to the source, for example, institutes, departments, or 
universities. In the popular ranking of the Shanghai Jiao Tong University, these errors led 
to differences of possibly 5 to 10 positions in the European list and about 25 to 50 
positions in the world list (Moed, 2002). The most important impact factor, Thomson´s 
ISI Web of Science, is accused of having many faults (Monastersky, 2005; Taylor, 
Perakakis, & Trachana, 2008). It is unlikely that the errors are distributed equally. 
Kotiaho, Tomkin, & Simmons (1999) find that names from unfamiliar languages lead to 
a geographical bias against non-English speaking countries. Third, it has been shown that 
small changes in measurement techniques and classifications can have large effects on 
the position in rankings (Ursprung & Zimmer, 2006). 
  
Methodological problems 
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Methodological problems of constructing meaningful and consistent indices to measure 
scientific output recently have been widely discussed (Adler & Harzing, 2009; Adler et 
al., 2008; Lawrence, 2002, 2003; Frey, 2003; Frey, forthcoming). Therefore, we briefly 
mention the main problems discussed in the literature. 
 First, there are selection problems. Only journal articles are selected for 
incorporation in the rankings, although books, proceedings or blogs contribute 
considerably to scholarly work. Other difficulties include the low representation of small 
research fields, non-English papers, regional journals, and journals from other disciplines 
even if they are highly ranked in their respective disciplines. Hence, collaboration across 
disciplinary boundaries is not furthered.  
 Second, citations can have a supportive or rejective meaning or merely a halo or 
herding effect. The probability of being cited is a function of previous citations according 
to the “Matthew effect” in science (Merton 1968). Simkin and Rowchowdhury (2005) 
estimate that, according to an analysis of misprints turning up repeatedly in citations, 
about 70–90 percent of scientific citations are copied from the list of references used in 
other papers; that is, 70–90 percent of the papers cited have not been read. Consequently, 
incorrect citations are endemic. They are promoted by the increasing use of meta-
analysis, which generally does not distinguish between high and low quality analyses 
(Todd & Ladle, 2008). In addition, citations may reflect fleeting references to fashionable 
“hot topics.” 
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 Third, using the impact factor of a journal as a proxy for the quality of a single 
article leads to substantial misclassification. Singh, Haddad, & Chow (2007) and 
Starbuck (2005) found that in management research many top articles are published in 
non-top journals, and many articles in top journals generate very few citations (see for 
economics Laband & Tollison, 2003; Oswald, 2007; for the journal Nature Campbell, 
2008). A study of the “International Mathematical Union” even concludes that the use of 
impact factors can be “breathtakingly naïve” (Adler et al., 2008: 14) because it leads to 
large error probabilities. 
 Fourth, there are difficulties comparing citations and impact factors between 
disciplines and even between subdisciplines (Bornman, Mutz, Neuhaus, & Daniel, 2008). 
 However, even if these technical and methodological problems could be resolved, 
there are problems caused by the dysfunctional reactions of scholars and institutions. 
Even more and better indicators could not overcome these kinds of problems (Osterloh & 
Frey, 2009). They will occur even if the bibliometric system were to work perfectly. 
 
Individual dysfunctional reactions. 
The dysfunctional reactions of individual scholars consist of goal displacement and 
counterstrategies to “beat the system.” Goal displacement (Perrin, 1998) means that 
people maximize indicators that are easy to measure and disregard features that are hard 
to measure. This problem is also discussed as the multiple-tasking effect (Holmstrom & 
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Milgrom, 1991; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2009). There is much evidence of this effect in 
laboratory experiments (Gilliland &Landis, 1992; Ordonez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, & 
Bazerman, 20096; Schweizer, Ordonez, & Douma, 2004; Staw & Boettger, 1990). For 
example, Fehr and Schmidt (2004) show that output-dependent financial incentives lead 
to the neglect of non-contractible tasks. This problem is avoided when principals are 
offered a fixed wage. 
 Empirical field evidence of goal displacement in academia is the “slicing 
strategy” (Weingart, 2005: 125) whereby scholars divide their research results into a 
“least publishable unit” by breaking them into as many papers as possible. This reaction 
is amplified when funding is dependent on the quantity of published papers. This was 
demonstrated in a study for Australia (Butler, 2003). The mid-1990s saw a linking of the 
number of peer-reviewed publications to the funding of universities and individual 
scholars. The number of publications increased dramatically, but the quality as measured 
by citations decreased. It could be argued that a remedy to this problem consists of 
resorting to citation counts. While this remedy overcomes some of the shortcomings of 
publication counts, it is subject to the technical and methodological problems mentioned. 
 Counterstrategies are more difficult to observe than goal displacement (Butler, 
2007). They consist of altering research behavior itself in order to “beat the system” 
(Moed, 2007). Numerous examples can be found in educational evaluation (e.g., Haney, 
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2002; Heilig & Darling-Hammond, 2008; Nichols, Glass, & Berliner, 2006).  The 
following behaviors are of special relevance in academia.  
 Scholars distort their results to please, or at least not to oppose, prospective 
referees. Bedeian (2003) finds evidence that no less than 25 percent of authors revised 
their manuscripts according to the suggestions of the referee although they knew that the 
change was incorrect. Frey (2003) calls this behavior “academic prostitution”. 
 Authors cite possible reviewers because the latter are prone to judge papers more 
favorably that approvingly cite their work, and these same reviewers tend to reject papers 
that threaten their previous work (Lawrence, 2003: 260).7 Authors willingly adapt to 
editors who pressure them to cite their respective journals in order to raise their impact 
rankings (Garfield, 1997; Smith, 1997; Monastersky, 2005). 
 To meet the expectations of their peers—many of whom consist of mainstream 
scholars—authors may be discouraged from conducting and submitting creative and 
unorthodox research. (Armstrong, 1997; Gillies, 2008; Horrobin 1996; Prichard & 
Wilmott 1997).  
 
Institutional dysfunctional reactions 
Dysfunctional reactions on the institutional level are manifold. Most importantly, the 
ranking system based on self-organized peer evaluation paradoxically results in an 
intensified control from outside the “republic of science,” in particular, by administrators 
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and politicians. “Managers are stealing power from scientists” (Lawrence, 2003: 259). 
Quantitative output indicators give politicians and administrators a handy instrument to 
manage academia from outside without knowing the process and content of research. 
However, managerial control theory suggests that such output control is inefficient when 
outputs are ambiguous and subject to change, and there are information asymmetries 
between the controller and the controlled. In these cases, only clan control is appropriate 
(Ouchi, 1977, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1985; Turner & Makhija, 2006), which is exerted by 
peers. Therefore, the intervention of administrators and politicians into academic self-
governance produces unintended effects on the academic system. 
 First, in academia, output control systems handling research from outside the 
system create a lock-in effect. Even those scholars and academic institutions that are 
aware of the deficiencies of bibliometrics and the administrative interventions based on 
them do well not to oppose them. If they do, they are not only accused of being afraid of 
competition, but also of not wanting to increase the prestige and resources of their 
department or university. Therefore, it is a better strategy to follow the rules and to play 
the game. A self-enforcing cycle sets in.  For example, in several countries, highly cited 
scientists are hired immediately before the evaluation of departments and programs are 
scheduled to take place in order to raise publication and citation records. Such “stars” are 
highly paid although they often have little involvement with the respective university. 
(Brook, 2003; Stephan, 2008). 
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 Second, a negative walling-off effect sets in. Scholars themselves are inclined to 
apply output criteria to evaluate each other in order to gain more resources for their 
research group or department. In addition, it is easier to count the publications and 
citations of colleagues than to evaluate the content of their scholarly contributions. By 
doing this, scholars delegate their own judgment to the counting exercise behind 
bibliometrics, although, by using such metrics, they admit their incompetence in that 
subject (Browman & Stergiou 2008). This practice is defended by arguing that 
specialization in science has increased so much that even within disciplines it is 
impossible to evaluate the research in neighboring fields (Swanson, 2004; van Fleet, 
McWilliams, & Siegel, 2000). However, this practice in turn reinforces specialization and 
furthers a walling-off effect between disciplines and subdisciplines. By using output 
indicators instead of communicating on the contents, the knowledge in the various fields 
becomes increasingly disconnected. This widens the gap between theory and practice and 
hampers the ability to create radical innovations that often cross disciplinary borders 
(Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Dogan, 1999).  
 Third, research is increasingly homogenized. Research endeavors tend to lose the 
diversity that is necessary for a creative research environment. This consequence was 
pointed out for business schools by Gioia & Corley (2002). For economics, Great Britain 
provides an example: the share of heterodox, not strictly neoclassical economics sank 
drastically since the ranking of departments became based mainly on citation counts. 
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Heterodox journals have become less attractive for researchers due to their smaller 
impact factor when compared to mainstream journals (Lee, 2007; see also Holcombe, 
2004).  
 Fourth, it is argued that a positional competition or a rent-seeking game takes 
place instead of an enhancement of research quality by the increased investment by 
universities and journals in evaluating research (Ehrenberg, 2000). It has been shown that 
the percentage of “dry holes” (i.e., articles in refereed journal which have never been 
cited) in economic research during 1974 to 1996 has remained constant (Laband & 
Tollison, 2003), though the resources to improve the screening of papers have risen 
substantially.    
 Despite the various criticisms, there seems to be a consensus that there is no 
alternative to bibliometrics and rankings as the main basis for research governance in 
academia. The theoretical basis for this system is not discussed. In particular, it is not 
questioned whether new public management and agency theory really do match the 
conditions of scientific work. Therefore, the dominant view emphasizes that a strong 
effort must be made to improve the present system (Adler & Harzing, 2009; Albers, 
2009; Butler, 2007; Moed, 2007; Starbuck, 2009).  
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PSYCHOLOGICAL ECONOMICS AS THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR 
ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE 
In research on corporate governance in recent times, agency theory as the dominating 
theoretical frame of corporate governance has been questioned (Daily, Dalton, & Canella, 
2003; Hillman & Daziel, 2003; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). The same is true for new 
public management (Bogh-Andersen, 2007; Giauque, 2003; Osterloh, Frey, & Homberg, 
2008). Yet, in the present governance system of academic research, agency theory and its 
implications are still in place,8 and its theoretical foundations are not discussed.  
 To do this, we draw on the newly emerging field of psychological economics. It 
has emerged because of criticism about the assumptions of homo economicus, the 
standard economic model of human behavior (for reviews, see Fehr & Falk, 2002; Rabin, 
1998). It seeks to reintroduce psychology into economics after standard economics had 
driven it out (Bruni & Sugden, 2007). Psychological economists investigate deviations 
from homo economicus in three main directions (Frey & Benz, 2004). First, individuals 
are boundedly rational. They are not able to maximize their expected utility. Second, 
individuals are boundedly self-interested. Depending on the circumstances, persons are 
not driven only by external rewards, but also by intrinsic motivation and prosocial 
preferences. Third, the utility concept of homo economicus is bounded. Psychological 
economists investigate subjective well-being or happiness as a measure for utility that 
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goes beyond financial income (Frey & Stutzer, 2002a, 2002b). In our analysis, we focus 
on the aspect of bounded self-interest, since this is arguably the most contested aspect of 
the agency paradigm.  
 Agency theory is based on the idea that individuals respond systematically in a 
self-interested way on extrinsic incentives from outside. This view disregards intrinsic 
preferences. People do not only react in an instrumental way, but they also act for their 
own sake or because of reasons lying within their own person. Examples are compliance 
with civic virtues, social or professional norms, self image (Ajzen, 1988), a flow 
experience in a fascinating activity (Cikszentmihalyi, 1975), or curiosity. 
 It is generally acknowledged that for academic research intrinsically motivated 
curiosity is of decisive importance (Amabile, 1996, 1998; Stephan, 1996). In standard 
economics and agency theory, these kinds of preferences are assumed to be a given and 
can be treated as constant. However, there exists considerable empirical evidence in 
psychology and psychological economics that this is not the case. Rather, there is a 
crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation by externally imposed goals and incentives as 
well as by perceived unfair treatment provided that intrinsic motivation exists in the first 
place (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Frey, 1992, 1997; Ordonez 
et al., 2009; for a survey of the empirical evidence, see Frey & Jegen, 2001).9 According 
to self-determination theory (Gagne & Deci, 2005), intrinsic motivation relies on two 
preconditions, autonomy and a supportive feedback helping to enhance ones 
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competence.10 Crowding-out intrinsic motivation is explained by a reduction of 
autonomy and a controlling instead of a supportive feedback. 
 From the point of view of psychological economics, output oriented rankings have 
four disadvantages that cannot be managed by improving the present governance system 
in academic research based on agency theory. First, intrinsically motivated curiosity to do 
research tends to be crowded out and is in danger of being substituted by extrinsic 
motivation to score high in rankings. Content loses importance (Kruglansky, 1975). 
Autonomy can be reduced by quantitative output measurements, in particular, if they are 
linked to incentives. A supportive feedback is not provided by quantitative output 
measurements because in contrast to qualitative peer reviews they do not tell scholars 
how to improve their research. 
 Second, if intrinsic motivation is crowded out and extrinsic motivation prevails, 
the dysfunctional reactions of scholars like goal displacement and counterstrategies are 
enforced because they are not constrained by intrinsic preferences. The inducement to 
“game the system” in an instrumental way may get the upper hand. 
 Third, a negative self-selection effect takes place, in particular, when monetary 
rewards are linked to the position in rankings. According to Merton (1973), in academia, 
there exists a special incentive system called “taste for science”. It is characterized by a 
relatively low importance of monetary incentives and a high importance of peer 
recognition and autonomy. People are attracted to research for which, at the margin, the 
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autonomy to satisfy their curiosity and to gain peer recognition is more important than 
money. They value the possibility of following their own scientific goals more than 
financial rewards. These scholars are prepared to trade-off autonomy against money, as 
empirically documented by Stern (2004): scientists pay to be scientists. The preference 
for autonomy to choose their own goals is important for innovative research in two ways. 
It leads to a useful self-selection effect, and autonomy is the most important precondition 
for intrinsic motivation, which in turn is required for creative research (Amabile, 1998; 
Amabile et al., 1996; Mudambi, R., Mudambi, S., & Navarra, 2007). 
 Fourth, a negative self-fulfilling prophecy of agency theory sets in by institutional 
designs (incentive system, measurement practice, selection process), social norms 
(obeying the norm of self-interest not to appear as foolish or naïve), and language 
(evoking a gain frame instead of a community frame) (Ferraro et al., 2005). If intrinsic 
motivation is crowded out, only extrinsic rewards work—the assumption of agency 
theory has become true (Ghoshal, 2005; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Gibbons, 1998).  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
GOVERNANCE 
The two approaches lead to different implications of how improvements of academic 
research governance can be achieved. Agency theory builds on ever more refined 
measurements to monitor and control academic researchers. In contrast, psychological 
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economics builds on careful selection and socialization to academic research, as well as 
on supporting the intrinsic motivation to undertake meaningful and creative research. 
These implications are discussed in turn. 
 
Implications from Agency Theory 
The proponents of the principal-agency theory for academia are well aware of some of its 
shortcomings. Three proposals are made to improve the present governance system in 
academia within the conventional paradigm, in particular, to improve rankings as the 
backbone of this system. 
 First, a temporary moratorium of rankings is suggested “until more valid and 
reliable ways to assess scholarly contributions can be developed” (Adler & Harzing, 
2009: 72). As is the case for most authors, they believe that the identification of particular 
shortcomings should serve as a stepping stone to develop a more reliable research 
evaluation system (see also Abramo et al., 2009; Starbuck, 2009).  
 Second, it is suggested that bibliometric indicators should not be used as ready-to-
go indicators lacking the competence to understand what is being measured (van Raan, 
2005). Therefore, standards of good practice for the analysis, interpretation, and 
presentation of bibliometric data should be developed and adhered to when assessing 
research performance. This needs a lot of expertise (Bornmann et al., 2008), which 
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constrains considerably the responsible use of rankings as a handy instrument for 
politicians and journalists to assess academic performance. 
 Third, a combination of qualitative peer reviews and bibliometrics, so-called 
informed peer reviews, should be applied. It is argued that they can balance the 
advantages and disadvantages of these two methods (Butler, 2007; Moed, 2007; 
Weingart, 2005). 
 While the three proposals may help to avoid some of the disadvantages of 
bibliometrics, they cannot avoid or balance strategic reactions in the form of goal 
displacement and counterstrategies of scholars and institutions. This applies even if 
qualitative and quantitative measures worked perfectly (Osterloh & Frey, 2009). 
 
Implications from Psychological Economics 
The application of psychological economics to the governance of academic research is in 
its infancy; it is therefore only possible to outline some implications in need of more 
theoretical and empirical analysis. 
 From the point of view of psychological economics, the following aspects are to 
be considered. Intrinsic motivation is necessary for academic research but it is 
undermined by rankings because they curtail autonomy and give no supportive feedback. 
According to the “taste of science” (Merton, 1973) extrinsic motivation mainly in the 
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form of peer recognition is important. Monetary compensation plays a role, though a 
secondary one. Two implications follow, which should be further analyzed. 
 First, instead of treating scholars as agents who have to be monitored 
permanently, it should be considered whether it is more appropriate to carefully socialize 
and select aspiring scholars in order to downplay the controlling role of peer reviews and 
rankings. The main idea is to find out whether scholars master the state of the art and are 
creative and intrinsically motivated for research—and then trust that he or she will indeed 
perform well. This approach to research governance was emphasized by the famous 
President of Harvard University James Bryan Conant (Renn, 2002):11 “There is only one 
proved method of assisting the advancement of pure science—that is picking men of 
genius, backing them heavily, and leaving them to direct themselves.” This view is still 
part of the “Principles Governing Research at Harvard,” which states:12 “The primary 
means for controlling the quality of scholarly activities of this Faculty is through the 
rigorous academic standards applied in selection of its members.” Such a system may 
lead a limited number of researchers, after having received tenure, to misuse their 
autonomy. However, it may be the price that has to be paid for creative research to 
flourish. 
 Though autonomy is taken to be essential in this approach, it still requires to some 
extent informed peer reviews in spite of their deficiencies. This applies during restricted 
periods, for example, the selection and socialization process and whenever scholars apply 
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to a new position or for a grant, or submit a paper. However, there is a great difference 
between being under pressure to publish permanently and being submitted to control 
during a certain phase, knowing that once this phase is over one will enjoy a wide range 
of autonomy. If the pressure to publish is low, peer reviews change their role. They can 
be perceived as supportive instead of controlling and thus will further intrinsic motivation 
instead of undermining it.   
Such governance principles also are employed in other professions characterized 
by a low degree of observable outputs, such as in the life-tenured American judiciary 
(Posner, forthcoming). These ideas are in accordance with empirical findings in 
psychological economics. They show that intrinsically motivated people do not shirk 
when they are given autonomy (Frey, 1992; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Fong & Tosi, 
2007). Instead, they raise their efforts when they perceive that they are trusted (Falk & 
Kosfeld 2006). This is of decisive importance for knowledge work (Kogut & Zander, 
1996; Osterloh & Frey, 2000). 
 Second, since researchers also are motivated extrinsically, awards may serve as an 
externally mediated recognition (Frey, 2007; Frey & Neckermann, 2008). In contrast to 
variable pay for performance, awards are not perceived as controlling. Instead, they are of 
a symbolic nature that gives supportive feedback. Empirical research suggests that 
symbolic rewards do not crowd out intrinsic motivation (Heckhausen, 1991). In addition, 
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criteria for awards are usually not clearly specified ex-ante and thus provide considerably 
lower incentives for goal displacement. 
 As already mentioned, psychological economics is in its infancy and needs to be 
further developed theoretically and empirically. Systematic applications to issues of 
research governance in academia to our knowledge have not been undertaken. For 
example, little is known to what relative extent the “taste for science” (Merton, 1973) in 
different stages of a scholar’s career contains intrinsic elements, the desire for peer 
recognition, and monetary interests. Another open issue is the implications for the 
allocation of resources for research. Gillies (2008) suggests that each research unit that 
has passed the rigorous selection processes should be allocated basic funds sufficient to 
do meaningful research. Horrobin (1996) argues that the present concentration of 
resources to huge “centers of excellence” or “research empires” only rarely achieves 
more than would be possible had the same funds been distributed to small research units. 
This is in accordance with the considerations that giving more and more resources to a 
few “research empires” may hinder outsiders from participating in the resource allocation 
(Burris, 2004; Viner, Powell, & Green, 2004) and cause a decreasing marginal effect of 
additional research resources. While there exists some empirical work in this regard 
(Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000; Jansen, Wald, Frenke, Schmoch, & Schubert, 2007), 
this issue must be further elaborated. 
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CONCLUSION 
Our paper contributes to governance research, in particular, to the neglected field of 
governance of academic research. The theoretical foundations of the present dominant 
view of research governance have rarely been seriously analyzed. Implicitly or explicitly, 
agency theory and its application in the form of new public management are taken for 
granted as a theoretical basis, as has long been the case in corporate governance. This 
approach relies on monitoring and sanctioning to govern agents’ behavior. We identify 
the major shortcomings of the present research governance in academia, in particular, 
peer reviews and rankings, and confront this view with an alternative approach. We 
suggest that the new, emerging psychological economics presents a fruitful avenue for 
research governance. In contrast to agency theory, psychological economics extends the 
motivational foundations beyond extrinsic preferences. In line with an understanding of 
scholarly research as a mainly curiosity driven endeavor, we include intrinsic motivation 
as a major determinant of scholarly behavior. In addition, following Merton (1973), the 
recognition by peers and supportive feedback is an important part of the motivational 
bundle of researchers that he aptly calls “taste for science.” 
 We also confront the different implications of the two approaches. Agency theory 
counts on the refinements of indicators and the measurement process. While these 
refinements may help to improve research governance, they cannot avoid the strategic 
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reactions of scholars and institutions. They also lead to a negative lock-in effect and a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. In contrast, psychological economics counts on a broader 
theoretical foundation of behavior including scholars’ intrinsically motivated curiosity, as 
well as the desire for peer recognition. In accordance with managerial control theory 
based on the work of Ouchi (1977, 1979), this alternative approach emphasizes selection 
and socialization of scholars and symbolic benefits in order to downplay the impact of 
rankings.  
We believe the theoretical ideas presented here provide a useful foundation for 
future research in a number of areas. In particular research governance should be 
extended to a general academic governance including teaching which we have not dealt 
with in this paper. Future research in academic governance could also link up to the 
discourse on professionalization recently directed to managers (Khurana 2007). It may be 
that agency theory has contributed to a de-professionalization of the scholarly 
community, possibly leading to an erosion of professional codes of ethics. In view of the 
experiences with the recent behavior of some managers, the possibility of such a 
development is an issue of concern. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                
1 We prefer the expression “psychological economics” rather than “behavioral economics” for two reasons. 
First, economists had already examined human behavior before this new field emerged. Second, 
Simon (1985) points out that the term „behavioral” is misleading since it may be confounded with 
the „behaviorist” approach in psychology. 
2 Patents should fulfil the task of transforming the public good “discovery” into a private good and at the 
same time to communicate the discovery. Patents on the one hand provide an incentive to invest in 
innovations by a legally enforced temporal monopoly, and on the other hand force to disclose the 
patent specification. However, it is questionable whether they really fulfil this task. Many 
discoveries are not patentable or the cost of disclosing are greater than the gains attainable form 
patenting. Moreover, there is an extensive discussion that today patenting in some fields, in 
particular university patenting, might have negative impact on the rates of innovation, see Nelson 
(2004, 2006); Dosi, Marengo & Pasquali (2006).  
3 See also the special issue of Science and Public Policy (2007) and the Special Theme Section on “The use 
and misuse of bibliometric indices in evaluation scholarly performance” of Ethics in Science and 
Environmental Politics, 8, June 2008. 
4 The most discussed study of peer reviewing was conducted by Peters and Ceci (1982). They resubmitted 
12 articles to the top-tier journals that had published them only 18 to 32 months earlier, giving the 
articles fictitious authors at obscure institutions. Only three out of 38 editors and reviewers 
recognized that the articles had already been published. From the remaining nine articles, eight 
were rejected. 
5 For example the British government decided to replace its Research Assessment Exercise based on 
qualitative evaluations with a system based on bibliometrics. Interestingly, the Australian 
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Government, which has used mostly bibliometrics in the past, plans in the future to introduce 
qualitative peer review methods (Donovan, 2007a). 
6 Locke and Latham (2009) in a rejoinder provide counterevidence to Ordonez et al. (2009). However, they 
disregard that goal setting may well work for simple but not for complex tasks within an 
organization. For the latter case, see Earley, Connolly, & Ekegren (1989) and Ethiraj & Levinthal 
(2009). 
7 Such problems of sabotage in tournaments have been extensively discussed in personnel economics, see 
Lazear & Shaw (2007).  
8 “Pay for performance” which has become scrutinized in new public management e.g. by Perry 2006; 
Osterloh, Frey & Homberg (2009) as well as in the for-profit management field, e.g., Osterloh & 
Frey (2004) in academia in some countries like UK and Australia prevail or has recently been 
introduced like in Germany or Austria. 
9 The crowding-out effect does not always takes place, e.g. Gerhard & Rynes (2003); Locke &Latham 
(2009), or is contested, e.g. Eisenberger & Cameron (1996). However the empirical evidence for 
complex tasks and actors intrinsically motivated in the first place is strong, see Deci, Koestner and 
Ryan (1999); Weibel, Rost & Osterloh (2009).  
10 A third precondition is social relatedness, see Gagne & Deci (2005). 
11 Letter to the New York Times, 13 August 1945. 
12 See http://www.fas.harvard.edu/research/greybook/principles.html. 
